The present technology approach for protecting against mileage counter forgery is primarily orientated towards improving the security of the odometer itself.
A common example for increasing security is to protect the hardware of the odometer by special physical measures. The usage of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) could protect against software manipulation. However, the negative aspect of those methods is that the actual mileage count can still be manipulated if someone has physical access to the device.
Because of that there is a constant competition between the automobile industry, which is trying to create equipment that is forgery and tamper proof, versus attackers who regularly find new ways to interfere with new protection mechanisms.
Present technology shows various methods for the documentation of electronic log books. The DE 100 08 352 A1 and DE 199 23 060 A1 describe systems that log driving activity and transmit it via a wireless connection. Additionally one is able to identify the driver of the vehicle during this process. This process allows keeping electronic driving logbooks outside of the actual vehicle. However this does not allow one explicitly to obtain the data of the mileage counter. The identification is fixed on the specific driver not the vehicle.
The DE 20 2008 03 describes a system that allows obtaining positioning data of a vehicle via cellular mobile connections. However this system likewise has the issue that the identification is not tied to a set vehicle. Here the identification occurs via a mobile device that can also be switched or removed. Additionally the positioning details are retrieved via GPS—the retrieved data and therefore the mileage counter is not entirely accurate due to the present incorrectness of GPS-Systems.